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Abstract: Mexico is a very centralized country mainly as a result of the
involvement ofthe federal government (FG) in functions thatwould be more
efflciently provided by subnational governments (sG). The concentration of
activities in the FG is the result of two institutional features: the unclear
legal assignment ofexpenditure functions across leveis ofgovernment, and
the assignment of sources of revenue that concentrates a larger share of
revenues in hands of the FG. In the presence of multiple uses of federal
transfers, and in the absence of information on the costs of providing SG
services, the FG has been reasonably reluctant to decentralize more func
tions. As long as the FG remains in control ofmost ofgovernment revenues,
it is important to ensure that the benefits from decentralization also accrue
to it. The transfer of functions should avoid SG neglect of those functions
that generate benefits to the rest ofthe country and keep control over the
size of transfers. One instrument that can achieve both objectives is a
widespread use of conditional grants.
Resumen: Las decisiones de la administración pública mexicana están
relativamentecentralizadas acausa de laparticipación del gobierno federal
(GF) en funciones que proveerían más eficientemente los gobiernos locales
(GL); esta situación se ha generado ante la poco clara asignación de funcio
nes entre niveles de gobierno y la concentración de fuentes de ingreso en el
ámbito federal. Al existir múltiples usos de las transferencias federales, y
poca información sobre los costos de realizarfunciones locales, es razonable
que el GF se muestre renuente a descentralizarfunciones, aunque reconoce
laventaja informativa que tienen los GL. Mientras el GF mantenga el control
* Banco de México. 1 wish to thank Raul Livas, John Quigley and Daniel Rubinfeld for
helpful suggestions. This paper was presented at the OECD-Brazil Seminar on Decentralization,
Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations, and Macroeconomic Governance, held in Brasilia on June
16-17, 1997. The comments of the participants to the seminar are gratefully acknowledged, as
well as those of two anonymous referees. Errors and opinions are my responsibility. The paper
was prepared before the creation ofthe Ramo 33 (Aportaciones a gobiernos estatales y munici
pales), which arethe kind oftransfers encouraged in this paper. Therefore this article has evolved
from a policy recommendation to an analysis ofthe advantages ofthese type of transfers.
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de las fuentes de ingreso, es importante garantizar que éste participe de
los beneficios de la descentralización, por lo que la transferencia de funcio
nes debe evitar que los GL descuiden funciones que generan beneficios
extensibles a otras comunidades y que eviten que el costo para el GF sea
creciente. Un instrumento para alcanzar ambos objetivos son las transfe
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In this paper, unless otherwise specified, the term subnational governments (sGs)
represents all the governments that are not at the federal level, which is the highest level in the
country. The government at this level is called the federal government (FG).
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In particular, SG5 have different priorities than the FG in their
expenditure patterns. First, they would prefer to increase spending on
functions that may create externalities and spend less on those that
generate national benefits. Many local functions have a distributive
effect because of the impact they have on poverty reduction, and
income distribution is a federal concern (according to Musgrave’s
classic division). As SG5 have to compete for the attraction ofricher tax
bases, they tend to decrease expenditure on local services to the poor
and spend in activitiesthat are complementary to capital. The positive
benefits that extend to the rest of the country associated with a
better-educated and healthierpopulation are otherfactors that reduce
local expenditure in poverty reduction. The latter effect is particularly
important in poorer localities where the more productive workers tend
to move to wealthier communities. It is mainly in activities with an
impact on living standards that we see the intermission of the FG in
local functions. Second, when it comes to intergovernmental transfers
SGs want to attract as large a share of federally collected revenue as
they can while the FG would like it to be just enough. But the FG does
not have the information about SG’s costs ofproviding their functions.
In Mexico until 1997, most federal transfers were of the block
grant type, that is, with no strings attached, which proceeded from a
tax-sharing agreement. The SGS can use them for the functions the FG
wants them to cover; for decreasing local tax collections, or for chang
ing the expenditure pattern, for example, reducing spending in na
tional goods and services, such as income distribution. The SGS benefit
from this information asymmetry, and they want to preserve their
superior position. For example, Mexican SGS do not provide informa
tion on their expenditures by function, and they demad more trans
fers even when there is evidence that they have used part of their
proceeds from the tax-sharing agreement to decrease their own tax
collections.
In the presence of multiple uses of federal transfers, and in the
absence ofinformation on the costs ofproviding SG services, it has been
difficult to determine an adequate level offederal transfers to the SG5.
The tax-sharing grant is divided among the SG5 using an objective
formula that can be changed only with the agreement of Sos and the
FG. But in negotiatingthe level ofthe tax-sharing fund, budget deficits
have been implicitly used to determine whether the transfers meet SG
needs. The FG reacted to the appearance ofpersistent deficits by most
states by increasing the size of the transfer in 1990, 1994, and 1996,
and also by negotiating a change in the formula to include population,
along with a timetable to gradually increase the weight ofthis factor.
The population factor was probably established to link the transfer
amount to SG costs. On their side, SGS have presented their deficits as
evidence of the insufficiency of the existing transfers, and have re-
quested an increase in the transfers instead of asking for a change in
the formula to cover their costs. (Even poor states — that, for other
purposes, complain that rich ones ought to compensate them for an
unequal distribution of federal investment — ask for more money
rather than for a reformulating.) Contrary to information about ex
penditure by function, when it comes to budget and debt information,
SGs are actually eager to show their information. 2 Summarizing, the
decentralization of functions to Sos could lead to less expenditure on
those goods and services whose benefits extend out of their jurisdic
tions, and, at the same time, the FG could lose fiscal control over
expenditures by extending increased transfers.
On the other hand, the FG knows that the SGS have better infor
mation on the needs and preferences of local constituencies, which is
necessary for an efficient allocation oflocal goods and services. In fact,
the FG uses this information for its public investment decisions. For
example, Solidaridad made allocations of federal money based on
requests of local governments and communities, and planed in con
junction with state and municipal governments (Programa Nacional
de Solidaridad, 1994). Other federal agencies follow this type of
planning in their investment decisions. The FG, by decentralizing
functions in which local information is important, could attain a more
efficient allocation ofgoods and services, as it would: 1) save resources
in information-gathering activities; 2) assign responsibilities in case
ofservice deficiency and insufficiency (which is particularlyimportant
in the relatively new context ofconflicting political parties at different
leveis of government); and 3) satisfy the preferences of the constitu
ency instead ofthose offederal agents.
As long as the FG remains in control of most of government
revenues, it is important to ensure that the benefits from decentral
2 This was the case when the FG proposed to change Article 9 ofthe Ley de Coordinación
Fiscal, which requires SGS to provide SG debt information.
Solidaridad is the name of the federal program for poverty reduction and regional
development that operated between 1989 and 1994. Previous and existing federal programs use
SG information in similar ways (SPP, 1988). Starting in 1996, half of the funds for regional
development are provided as block grants.
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ization also accrue to it. Then the transfer of functions should avoid
SG neglect of those functions that generate benefits to the rest ofthe
country and keep control over the size of transfers. One instrument
that can achieve these two objectives is awidespread use ofconditional
grants, i.e., transfers that impose sorne condition on the recipient
government. This type oftransfer, besides allowing the FG to guaran
tee adequate SG spending on particular functions, provides tools for
the control of SG expenditures. Conditional grants require information
on the expenditures they are conditioned on, which can be used for
cost estimation and yardstick competition or other cost reducing
incentive schemes. By separating expenditures, the FG can lirnit pos
sible revenue insufficiencies to particular functions. These transfers
could be matching grants that, by requiring local contributions, can
increase local tax collection effort, addressing the problem of dwin
dling local tax collections through the tax-sharing agreement (Gram
lich, 1977). Conditional grants coukl also be used to provide incentives
for SGS to decrease provision costs, e.g. increasing the rnatching rate
to lower provision cost governments.
This paper starts by reviewing the current fiscal assignment of
expenditure and revenue functions in Mexico. Section 2, which con
centrates on expenditure functions, shows that Mexico’s legal design
allows SG5 to take most responsibilities but the assignrnent is unclear,
which leaves the door open for the FG to take part in functions that
would be more efficiently provided by local governments. It also shows
that there is a bias in the type ofinformation that SG5 provide: a lack
of information on expenditure by function at the state and municipal
leveis and willingness to show their persistent deflcits and their
increasing indebtedness. Section 3 describes the division of revenue
sources and the systern ofintergovernrnental transfer’. The sas have
access to many tax bases of small size which, when added together,
generate poor collections, while the FG has the broader and richer tax
bases. The FG compensates the governments at the lower levels mainly
through the federal block grants program. 4 The total size ofthe trans
fers increased to cornpensate states that lost out when the sharing
forrnula was changed. The formula started with fixed coefficients;
then the states shares increased according to their economic activ
ity; then their shares increased with the federal taxes they collected;
‘ These grants constitute the Sistema de Coordinación Fiscal, a tax-sharing agreement
between the FG and SGs, and are calledparticipaciones.
and recently the formula has incorporated population. However, the
persistence ofstate deficits is likely to create furtherchanges.
Based on the information provided about Mexican fiscal federal
ism, section 4 evaluates the problern ofcentralization as one ofdiffer
ences in the motivations of governrnents at different levels, in the
absence ofinstruments to align their preferences. The level ofgovern
mentthat controis revenues will keep control ofexpenditure functions,
in which preferences are different, even if that is inefficient for the
country as a whole. In Mexico, the FG has been able to interfere in SG
activities because ofthe legal void and because it has more revenues. For
decentralization to proceed, it is irnportantthat local governrnents satisfy
national priorities. Therefore, state and municipal governments have to
devote enough resources to national services, and provide good informa
tion on their expenditure leveis, so that the FG is able to determine the
adequacy ofits transfers to rneet SG functions. Conditional grants would
achieve this objective, as is argued in section 5.
2. Mexican Fiscal Expenditure Assignment
In Mexico, the proportion oftotal government expenditures that state
and local governrnents constitute is lower than in other federal coun
tries (Figure 1). Mexico also is a very centralized federation ifjudged
by the involvement ofthe national governmentinthe delivery ofservices
like health and education (Figures 2a and 2b). The degree ofincorne and
development neither determines nor is associatedwith this condition, as
can be seen by looking at Argentina, Brazil, and India. 6
Since this comparison could also be interpreted as showing few
efficiency gains from decentralization, to have a closer inspection of
the degree ofcentralization, and to see whether Mexico can gain from
decentralization, we first determine which functions should be lower
level responsibilities, and then compare those with the actual assign
ment in Mexico.
Following Inman (1988), military expenditures are exciuded from these numbers. This
is a federal expenditure that vanes with factors unrelated to the division of functions among
levels ofgovernment.
6 In Mexico, local governments have more expenditure decision power than under unitary
governments. For example, in Chile the central government is in charge of 91.62% of total
expenditures, while in Spain it controls over 88%. The latter case is particularlystriking, because
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2.1. Theoretical Assignment
This subsection presents those characteristics of public services that
vary in their geographical range. Mexico has three layers of govern
ment: federal, state, and municipal; this subsection matches the
features of the analyzed services to their appropriate leveis. This
analysis takes the existing local jurisdictions as an institutional con
straint. This analysis therefore ignores many interesting problems
deaiing with jurisdictional design, either in the areas that govern
ments cover or in their number of governments (Shah, 1994, chap-
ter 1). However this neglect is appropriate to the Mexican setting,
where a change of local jurisdictions seems less iikely than a reforrn
of the current fiscal arrangement among the existing ones. 7
As the primary difference among leveis of government is their
geographical range, the literature has looked at the geographical
characteristics ofgovernment functions. This type of analysis follows
Musgrave’s classification (according to the incentives each level has
for efficient provision) which assigns the allocation function to differ
ent leveis depending on the spatial characteristics ofthe government
goods. Four of thern are presented in Table 1. These are: 1) the
geographical range where the service is a public good; 2) the externali
ties a function generates to other localities; 3)whether or not there are
economies ofscale or scope in the provision ofthe function; and 4) the
satisfaction ofthe preferences ofthe affected set ofconsumers. These
features are explained in a more detailed way in Shah (1994). The
expenditure functions (services) are taken from those in Shah (1990
and 1994). Another factor to be considered in section 4 is the abilities
ofthe different government levels to process informatiçp.
Table 1 assigns each allocation function to a level ‘ofgovernrnent
according to the previouscrer. That is, each function, according to
its characteristics, is assigned to the level most appropriate to take
over that responsibility. For weighing these criteria in the final as
signrnent, the table uses the concept of subsidiarity. This principie
assigns the service to that authority for which externalities are inter
nalized, when it is possible to separate the production from the
Unless otherwise specifled, the criteria for the division of functions come from the
discussions over fiscal federalism contained in Oates (1972), Quigley (1993), and Shah (1990 and
1994).
provision ofthe service (see Inman and Rubinfeid, 1993).8 The optimal
allocation assignrnent appears in the last column, whiie the previous
column shows the authority that would reguiate the activity (which is
the level where the good is public). 9
Since sorne ofthese functions represent severa! types ofservices,
the entena can yield prescriptions for more than one level ofgovern
ment. Sorne services may belong to the federal level and others to the
state level. Exarnples ofthese are education, with the division between
professional and basic education, and health, with the distinction
between preventive care and specialized treatments. Due to the lack
of space, a more detailed division is not in this paper.’°
2.2. Actual Assignment
The existent Mexican legal assignment is clear and coincides with the
theoretical frarnework on the assignment ofexpenditure functions and
tax bases (analyzed below) to the federal and municipal levels. How
ever it is vague about what belongs to the state leve!, and such a wide
scope in the assignment actuallyworks to limit the performance ofSGS.
First, the federal level interferes in functions where its responsibility
is not explicitly mentioned. Second, sos barely participate in functions
provided together with the FG, as the national congress assigns most
ofthe services to the wea!thier federal level (Figure 2). In the end, the
states provide rnost of their services with other levels, playing a
secondary role in those in which the FO takes part, and frequently
interfering in the functions and income sources ofthe municipalities.
Besides thwarting state participation in expenditure flinctions,
this lackofclarity is problematic because it leaves the final assignment
subject to the interpretation ofthe authority distributing revenues or
in charge of solving conflicts among levels. Up to now this authority
8 In those cases in which the separation is impossible, the table uses the criterion coming
from the decentralization theorem of Oates (1972) which assigns the service to the lowest level
for which there are no externalities, for which the beneflts ofthe good are exhausted, and which
can produce the service without incurring higher costs.
Provided the existent fiscal gap regulation could be implemented through pecuniary
incentives, so that the regulatory authority should be involved in the financing ofthe function. 10 A second reason for a correspondence between functions and leveis is that states and
municipalities vary considerably in size, population, and income. This problem of variation in
financial capacity is tackled in Gamboa (1997, chapter III) by offering a menu for local


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































has been the national congress (which is perceived as following orders
from the federal executive),’ 1 and with the recent reform oft•hejudicia
ry, the Supreme Court could potentially decide the fiscal arrangement
based on poorly determined Constitutional boundaries. Table 2 illus
trates the relative importance of the federal level under the present
arrangement. The large participation ofthe federal level in infrastruc
ture expenditures also shows the federal level intervening in state
responsibilities •12
The problem is even worse for municipalities, where the FG is not
the only one to interfere with their activities. The Constitution gives
them legal status by assigning them functions, but gives the state
legislature the responsibility to decide when the so has to help munici
pal governments. This prescription in practice amounts to taking away
from many municipalities important functions like water provision,
street maintenance, road building, etc. As will be seen below, the
Constitution stresses this dependency on the revenue side, practically
turning municipalities into administrative departments of SGS.
Table 3 compares the de facto Mexican expenditure assignment
withthe theoretical assignment ofsubsection 2.1. Forthe federal level,
there is information on expenditures by function. However this is not
the case for the state and municipal leveis; the services undertaken
by these levels come from available information on functions for which
these governments charge fees.’ 3 This table shows that municipalities
only perform their prescribed functions. On the other hand, SG5 take
the functions that the fiscal federalism literature recommends, but the
states also participate in areas that Table 1 assigns to the municipal
level. This could be a consequence of the small size of many munici
palities, in terms of population, income level, or geography. Poor














































-o 11 The Economist in its 10/28/95 issue calis it a “rubber-stamp congress”.
12 Investment expenditures by subnational governments in centralized and developed
countries, as France, is 68%, the UK., 55%, or in federalist and developing, as India, is 60%,
Brazil, 65%, and Argentina, 49%. On the other hand, Mexico is ahead of centralist developing
countries Iike Chile where it is 10%.
13 This information is taken from the 1993 revenue laws ofthe states and the 1994 revenue
Iaws of municipalities. It is based on the revenue concepts extracted by INDETEC (1994). The
functions of the federal government are taken from the Sexto Informe de Gobierno de Carlos
Salinas de Gortari and the Informe sobre el Programa Nacional de Solidaridad.
It is worth mentioning that the existence ofa fee does not show the degree ofparticipation


























































































































































Federal and Border Police F
Special Police F, E
Distribution F
Regional Development F
Airlines and Trains F
Ecology F, E































*Local trade, zoning, streets cleaning and waste disposal only appear in this table as
they come from the services on which governments collect charges. These are municipal servi
ces as they are publicly private goods.
are so scarcely populated or present such a reduced or abrupt territory
such that service provision renders economies ofscale. 14
The most important deviation from the theoretical assignment
comes at the federal level: the FO is involved in more activities (Table
3) than in the prescriptive Table 1. This interference in the activities
ofother leveis comes mainly through the National Solidarity Program
(the program to combat extreme poverty). The reason is that the
services provided by the local levels have a strong impact in people’s
living standards and, as Musgrave argued, the distributive function
should be a federal responsibility.
Solidarity is best known for its financing oflocal publicinfrastruc
ture. It selects among projects requested by the community, ideally
basing its decision on the success of the project in reducing poverty.
Solidarity is one of the FG programs that explicitly considers local
The extreme example is the State of Oaxaca, which divides its 36,275 square miles
among 570 municipalities.
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community preferences in its expenditure decisions. In fact, part of
the financing of the project comes from the community members’
unpaid work, which shows the benefit of the investment. Solidarity,
as other federal agencies do, coordinates its investment decisions with
local governments. However, Solidarity’s system hinders local level
decision-making. Federal criteria ultimately determine which local pro
jects are carried out. Furthermore, these criteria are far from transpar
ent, which leaves room for discretion in its assignment and does not allow
local governments to know the resources at their disposal.
The government that finances the program and the one that
provides the services do not have to be the same. The function ofthe
federal level is to distribute resources so that poor communities have
access to basic services, while the function of local governments is to
provide the services the community values most. The anti-poverty
program objectives and resources, as well as those of other federal
agencies, should be made expiicit through an objective distribution.
Being able to predict available funds, municipalities and states would
be abie to determine the best investments for their communities.
Summarizing, constitutional mandates in principie give broad
functions to the states, but it is not ciear which functions beiong
exclusively to this level, and does not separate responsibilities in those
functions supplied by severai leveis. The interpretation ofthese man-
dates has been favorable to the federal level. In practice, Sos partici
pate in a reduced way in those functions they perform with the FG.
Furthermore, the federal level, mainlythrough its social development
policy, has jurisdiction over a number of functions that in principie
belong to the state or municipal leveis. This creates an inefficient
allocation, as the level closest to the final consumers arguably knows
community preferences better, but does not always deide over alloca
tions oflocal goods. Additionally, with this blurry division offunctions,
it is not possible to determine responsibilities in case of service
deficiency or insufficiency, and community participation in pubiic
decisions is therefore hindered.
3. Revenue Sources across Leveis of Government
On the revenue side, states and municipal governments have few tax
bases they can utilize efficiently and at low administrative cost.
Accordingly, the federal level exploits the broadest and richest tax
bases of the country. It is therefore necessary for the FO to transfer
part of its tax collectiors to local governments, which makes these
governments heavily dependent on these grants and allows the fed
eral government to interfere with local functions.
3.1. Theoretical Division
Bird (1992) argues that the tax bases that are efficient and simple to
administer by local governments are few and poor. Local taxation
creates several distortions, such as tax exportation and externalities
(Inman and Rubinfeid, 1993, explain these concepts). This precludes
sos from imposing the ideal benefit taxation, in which communities
face a clear link between service provision and cost.
With high factor mobility, tax externalities could have a sizable
impact, as small changes in rates lead factors to reaccommodate
affecting other SGS. On the other hand, tax exportation is a major
concern for goods produced in few Iocations around the country, in
which case the location offactors would hardly depend on local taxes.
Thus there follows the prescription to assign to the federal level the
taxation of natural resources and other goods with site-specific loca
tions (because of tax exportation) and that of factors with elastic
supply (because oftax externalities).
Additionally, because taxes on people or corporate incomes re
quire information about transactions taking place in several locations
withinthe country, the FG, whichhas this knowledge, can have abetter
assessment of this tax base. This is also the case with value-added
taxes that require cross-referencing of information from different
points in the country. Another consideration that favors the assign
ment to the federal level is economies of scale in handling this infor
mation in a single administrative location.
In addition to these considerations, to the extent that the tax
structure reflects distributive and stabilization concerns, which are
federal functions according to Musgrave, more tax bases will belong
to the federal level. Tanzi (1995) stressesthe importance ofthe federal
level in this respect, as the stabilization problemthat most developing
countries face is at a national rather than regional level. In this case,
national coordination is more important than decentralized policies.
Macroeconomic stability sometimes requires drastic changes in public
finances (which has been the case in Mexico, at least in 1982, 1988 and
206 207Rafael Gamboa Conditional Transfers to Promote Local Government
1995).’ The larger the portion controlled by the FG, the more likely
this policy is to be successful. In addition to these, local governments
often create fiscal problems for the federal level by running deficits
they cannot cover (Bomfim and Shah, 1994). Ah of these consider
ations have been taken into account in the design of the Mexican
revenue structure, which as a result is fairly centralized (Figure 1).
To take advantage of a decentralized provision, it is necessary to
desigri a system that transfers resources from the richer federal tax
collections to local governments. However, a transfer system could
itself be inefficient. Federal grants should be large enough for local
governments to perform their functions; i.e., this source together with
local tax collections has to cover their expenditures. To the extentthat
grants fail to satisfy this objective, theywill promote a misuse ofpublic
funds, either because resources are wasted or because rich communi
ties enjoy lower tax rates, or because these funds are insufficient to
cover local expenses. Besides problems associated with the appropri
ate amount of transfers, these could impose distortions on local gov
ernment allocations of public resources.
Transfers may also be used as instruments of the FG to achieve
national goals. A well-designed distribution formula could eliminate
local tax distortions, or provide incentives to internalize externalities,
or it might improve income distribution or help to stabilize the econ
omy. For each ofthese objectives there are several types oftransfers.
In this paper the focus of attention is to finance those functions in
which there is federal government interference because on national
concerns, for which transfers have to be conditioned to the perfor
mance ofthose functions.
3.2. Mexican Division ofRevenue Sources
to Leveis ofGovernment
In this section a comparison is made between the existing Mexican
assignment and the theoretical framework. Table 4 shows the current
division of tax bases among levels ofgovernment, which for the most
part is consistent with the theoretical framework. It assigns the richest
and broadest tax bases to the federal level, as can be seen below.
Figure 3. Composition ofState Revenues
Evolution of State Revenue Components
Billions of 1993 Pesos

















Source: Finanzas públicas estatales y municipales, INEGI.
1993
Figure 4. Direct Revenues ofthe States
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Source: Finanzas públicas estatales y municipales, INEGI.
1) Income, assets and value added taxes are collected by the
federal level because of its advantage in information over local levels
and the concern for tax externalities.
2) Taxes over services produced with national goods, as oil reve
nues, and over foreign trade are collected by the federal level, to avoid
tax exportation.
3) Special taxes’ 6 are handled by the federal level, because ofthe
concern for externalities that could emerge from tax competition and
because national policies over these goods.
4) Telephone services, property acquisition, vehile possession
and use, and new cars are also assigned to the federal level, but in this
case tax exportation and externalities are low. In fact, the federal
government has proposed the devolution to the states ofthe last two,
whose proceeds already belong to the states.
The level ofstate revenues in real terms has been fairly constant
for the Iast 15 years. However, there has been an important change in
the revenue components. Figure 3 shows an increase in federal trans
fers and a decline in direct (state collected) revenues. But not ah direct
revenue components have dechined. While most of them show a de
crease in real terms durifigthe 1980s, user charges (derechos) present
a slight increase (Figure 4). In 1990, federal transfers reached 70% of
non-debt state revenues, while none of the other sources constituted
a significant fraction ofthe total (Figure 5). Subsection 3.3 looks at the
transfer system and shows the importance for SGS that this source
acquired in 1980, and it also points out that the fraction of federal
transfers to the states has increased continuously since then. As will
be argued afterwards, this pattern shows that SGS are expandingtheir
collection ofthose sources that are less politically costly, and decreas
ing those which anger their local constituencies, at the expense of
federal revenues.
By an agreement between the three leveis ofgovernment, the federal
level shares its tax collections with local leveis. The National System
of Fiscal Coordination (Sistema de Coordinación Fiscal, scF) took
effect in 1980 to expand tax collections and reduce production distor
tions arising from double taxation. Under this agreement, states
exchanged their tax bases over income, production and sales for larger
transfers. The SCF attained its objective because total resources avail
able to federal and local governments increased since the beginning of
the program by 30% in real terms. Furthermore, although the fraction
of federal revenues transferred to state and local governments has
increased, federal revenues, as a proportion oftotal government rev,e
nues, has remained almost constant.
A major problem has been that the SCF failed to provide a link
between state needs and revenues, extending the participaciones (as
the tax-sharing transfers are called) according to the share of tax
collections each state had in 1979. Although the formula has changed
to include population size, it still provides larger transfers to states
with richertaxbases.’ 7 Furthermore, in percapita terms, the transfers
increase with state income at a much faster rate than average wages
(which is a proxy for public service costs). This system allows SGS with
richertax bases to provide better or more services than poor ones. This
distribution scheme helps to preserve regional disparities in the coun
16 The most irnportant ones are gasoline, tobacco and alcohol. 17 Table 6 describes the sharing formula.
Figure 5. Composition of State Revenues in 1990
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try, which necessitates further participation ofthe FG in the provision
ofdistributive goods.
The loss ofconnection between transfers and costs is problematic,
given the importance of this source of revenue to SGS. The FG has an
implicit obligation to cover the costs of SGS, but it does not know them.
SGS have incentives to overlook possible expenditure-reducing policies,
as the federal level mainly pays the cost of raising revenues. The SCF
started a process that has benefited the state level, as the share they
receive from the federal level revenue collections has steadily in
creased from 18.45% in 1980 to 22.72% in 1994. Table 5 describes the
evolution ofthe SCF.
Contrary to what would happen under equalization transfers,
where federal grants would show a negative correlation with state
fiscal capacity, in Mexico richer states receive larger transfers.’ 8
However, poor states do not demand a change in this sharing system.
Opposition by rich states or uncertainty about the benefits of a new
formula does not seem strong enough reasons to explain this behavior.
The controversy over the appropriate size of the transfer fund solves
this puzzle. At this stage, states are competing for more resources
vis-?j-vis the federal level rather than disputing among themselves.
Instead of discussing the objective criteria for dividing the existing
tax-sharing fund, the controversy is over the total size of the fund,
which as a result has constantly increased for the past 15 years. That
is, for the past years, the federal government has been increasing the
fraction oftransfers at the expense ofits own programs.
But still it would seem as if the transfers have not been enough
to cope with costs, as states have accumulated debt at an unsustain
able pace duringthe past sevenyears, with commercial banks as major
lenders. Since 1988, the debt ofMexican states has incrctsed at a pace
of62% in real terms (Figure 6) a sharp increase in State expenditures
in real terms since 1987 (Figure 7).
The Constitution establishes that state debt should be acquired
only for productive investments. However, the data show that this
increased debt has not increased state revenues. On the other hand,
perhaps its purpose has been to cover an increase in the cost of
‘ 8 Table 7 shows thatparticipaciones have a significant and positive correlationwith State
GDP and that “direct revenues” also present this type of correlation. The correlation however
has decreased with time and with the inclusion of population in the formula. Higher provision
cost would explain this pattern as well, however the pattern is a consequence oftransfers being,
to a large extent, still a reflection oftax collections before 1980.
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Figure 6. Real State Debt
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Figure 7. Components ofState Expenditures
Evolution of State Expenditures
Figure 8. Proportion of State Expenditure Components
Fraction by Type of State Expenditure
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providing services or to make up for a decrease in revenues. Due to
the lack ofdata on expen’diture by function, and because the available
information does not show a change in any particular type of expen
diture (Figure 8), it is not possible to determine if cost increases are
the cause ofthese persistent deficits. Furthermore, debt accumulation
is not correlated with the sources ofstate revenues (federal or direct).
That is, the over-borrowing problem is not exclusive to states with less
revenue.’ 9
It is therefore not possible to establish responsibility in this debt
accumulation episode, as the needs are unknown, and shortage ofstate
revenues does not seem to be the cause. A structural solution cannot
be based on trend projections of current expenditures and revenues.
It is necessary to clarifythe functions performed by the different levels
to determine responsibility. If these deficits are a consequence of
higher costs, higher transfers are in order, on the contrary, if they
derive from poor or deceitful administrations, higher transfers will
simply increase an already inefficient allocation ofresources. 2 °
In summary, the SCF agreementhas alwaysgenerated grievances,
since the states claim that their revenues are not enough to covertheir
costs. At the beginning, the complaint was the lack offlexibility in the
distributing formula. States complained that a higher level of eco
nomic activity required more resources. After a change in the formula
to reflect economic activity, states that were engaged in expenditures
based on their previous revenues demanded the establishment of a
fund to guarantee constant transfers. This required an increase of
the fund. Later, two more funds were introduced, bringing more
resources to local governments. Finally, the FG, in an effort to relate
costs to transfers, but arguing for equity, introduced population as a
factor in the distribution formula. The FO had to further increase the
size of the fund to keep rich states in the agreement. At the present
time, showing their recently accumulated debt as a signal of their
insufficient revenues, states are asking for a still larger fraction of
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Table 8 presents regressions ofdebt accumulation with several variables. 20 In Gamboa (1997) the local indebtedness problem is analyzed. 21 For 1996 the fraction of federal revenues to be transferred has increased again.
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4. Transferring Functions and Funds in Exchange
for Cost Information
Different leveis have different abilities in the allocation of functions.
In providing government services there is a tradeoff between coordi
nation, which requires centralization, and the need for local informa
tion, which is better handied at the local level. Local leveis can more
easily identify community preferences over local goods. They are able
to react faster to new needs, and save higher authorities from process
ing large amounts of information. This is the basis for taking sub
sidiarity as dividing criterion: state and local governments should be
favored when information about local conditions is important. On the
other hand, in cases in which the actions of a SG complement the
actions taken by another SG, federal direction would be preferred: that
is, when there is greater need for coordination because the service
affects many states.
However, as Table 1 shows, for many functions, the separation
among leveis is especially difficult. Which level should be in charge of
these functions? There is no obvious answer, as the variation across
countries shows. The particular conditions each level faces translates
into different preferences in the provision ofthese functions (i.e. public
allocation of funds vanes depending on the level that provides the
functions). As the need for coordination increases, these preferences
tend to diverge. Local authorities tend to ignore complementarities
and externalities, while it is more expensive for federal agents to
acquire local demand information.
The assignment offunctions depends on who decides the assign
ment. The FG, the SG5, and a benevolent central planner would hoid
different opinions. Table 1 presented the central planner’s allocation.
The current Mexican division because of its revenue centralization
perhaps shows the FG’s preferences.2 2 When a function is not legally
assigned to a specific level, the level with the richer tax base will keep
it to meet its own priorities. The history ofthe fiscal structure deter
mines the possible reforms (Bird, 1992, and Quigley, 1993). In Mexico,
the evolution of the institutional arrangement has benefited the FG






22 The SG’s opinion was presented in the 1995 meeting ofstate secretaries offinance. Five
central states of Mexico, which constitute fiscal Zone 5, suggested that the federal level would
only keep international matters and national defense.
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the FG tends to keep the function rather than delegate it (Armstrong,
1994). This explains the high degree of centralization in Mexico and
the division ofexpenditure functions. However,havingthe control over
a function and providing the service are two different things. There
are mechanisms to transfer functions without relinquishing control,
in this paper only one is analyzed, but first it is important to identify
cases in which this transfer offunctions is beneficial for the FG.
The advantages of delegation are, first, that provisiofl could be
made according to local market information, and, second, that by
separating responsibilities, more powerful incentive schemes could be
instituted. The advantage of decentralizatiOn over integrated provi
sion is abetter match between local preferences and provided services,
which implies savings on information gathering and processing activi
ties. In its allocation decisions the FG level recognizes the superiority
of the SGs in providing local information as investment planning is
carried together with SGS. The final outcome, however, is a federal
responsibility.
The mechanism creates distortions because local governments
negotiate funds tryingto satisfy federal preferences over expenditures
in so preferred activities. At the bargaining table, these governmentS
overstate the needs in whichthere is a federal concern, to attract more
resources, and try to shape federal programs according to their own
priorities.
The federal level attempts to overcome this difficulty in two ways.
First, by having each federal agency negotiate separately on behalf of
the federal level, and second, by encouraging the state level to provide
part of the funding for state activities, in order to evaluate the state
need for federal funds. However the discretion involved in these
procedures do not align the preferences of the two levls; neither do
they extract ah state’s private information. Contrary to these objec
tives, they multiply negotiation costs, and give weak incentives forthe
SG to search for better investment projects for which they do not pay
the costs, and the states end up encouraging their preferred activities
in any case. On the otherhand, decentralizing responsibilities through
an objective system oftransfers conditioned on service delivery could
use this private information for a better performance.
In those functions in which there is simultaneous provision by
federal and state governmentS and there is local advantage, there
could be the additional benefit ofhaving a clear assignment ofrespon
sibility in case of service deficiency or insufficiency. This assignment
222
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allows for the use ofstrong incentive schemes. Those who blame lack of accountability to the ‘absence of locally generated revenues fre quently neglect the benefit of a clear assignment. In Mexico, several thousand demands for local services were addressed directly to the federal level, through Solidarity. The blame for local community demands that were not met could go to either one ofthe three leveis. The clear delineation ofresponsibilities is particularly important now that different political parties are running different leveis ofgovern ment. This being the case, politics may start tojeopardize local service provision. Many problems of decentralization can be solved by using conditional grants, where the funds are allocated to the function favored by the FG on the basis of an objective formula.
5. Concluding Remarks and Policy Recommendation
Mexico is relatively centralized. State and local leveis decide over a lower share of government expenditure than in other federal coun tries. The federal level intervenes in many functions that could be efficiently provided at the state or local level. On the revenue side, state and local leveis are very dependent on federal grants, which limits their ability to adjust revenues to expenditure needs. Created in 1980, the SCF transfers federally collected revenues to local governments. The system has been successful at increasing total government collections, but the division among levels and govern ments has created other problems. First, proceeds are not distributed according to government needs and seem to be insufficient to cover their provision costs. Second, by giving up part oftheir tax bases, the state level became particularly dependent on these transfers. And because the division of expenditure functions is not clearly deter mined, the assignment ofmost expenditure functions has gone to the FO, the level with enough resources to finance these activities. Under these conditions improvements toward decentralization depend on the advantages that the FG sees in delegating functions to other leveis. The advantage of delegation is that local leveis have access to information on community needs and preferences. This allows these governments to make a more efficient allocation ofpublic funds. For the FO, collecting this information is costlier, and the problems ofprocessing ah the information are even greater. Therefore there is a gain for the FG in transferring functions that require large
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amounts oflocal information (i.e. functions where coordination among
states is not very important).
However the FG has two concerns with SG provision. First, for
sorne services the interests of the SG and the FG do not coincide. The
FG interferes with lower leveis in those functions with sorne national
characteristic (i.e., functions that a central planner would not assign
to the FG but that somehow affect the rest of the country). The FG5
participation allows it to reflect its preferences on public allocations
in these services.
The second problem is more specific to the Mexican context.
Recently states have accumulated large debts, which cannot be traced
to any specific service, as there is no good information to assess the
origin ofthe recurrent deficits. Because oftheir dependency on federal
transfers, the reaction ofthe FG has been to increase the fraction ofthe
revenues it transfers to the states (and more recently sorne effort has
been rnade to link transfers and costs). The suspicion ofthe FG is that
bytransferring more functions, it will lose all its control over revenues,
as local functions would also be financed through the SCF.
But decentralization of more functions does not have to proceed
along these lines. In particular, other types oftransfers could achieve
the objective of financing the cost of local functions and align local
preferences with national interests.
The current system oftransfers has to cover only local functions
(those currently under the control ofstates and municipalities), using
a formula that closes the gap between local revenues and service costs,
i.e., taking into account local tax bases as indicator ofrevenue capacity
and population as an indicator ofneed. 23
More specific to this paper, to finance functionswh externalities
or those that improve income distribution, conditionLil grants should
be used. Conditional transfers should be used to finance national
goods; e.g., those with a distributive character, a per capita transfer
that guarantees a rninimum level would be appropriate, while a
matching grant could guarantee that externalities are internalized. If
transfers are conditional on an acceptable provision by the local
government, the FG guarantees its interests and receives only the
relevant information.
If transfers are conditional on expenditure by function, lower
23 This indicatorhas the advantage ofbeing objective, reduces rent-seeking activities, and
is available annually, which makes it flexible.
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leveis have to provide inforrnatjon on expenditure in the function.
State and municipal go’-ernrnents have to improve their accounting
practices and their release offinancial information. A federalist struc
ture, in which local governments act independently, requires revenue
and cost projections, as well as transparent information about the use
of public funds. This is an irnportant step to improve accountability
and also, as the recent indebtedness problem of the states shows, to
define whether more transfers are required.
These transfers should not be discretionary, but proceed frorn an
objective formula that takes mt 0 account nationally adequate levels
of provision and state capacity to raise revenues for the function.
Currently in Mexico, federal agencies take local informatjon for their
planning, but in their negotiation with local governments, SGs provide
biased information so as to obtain larger funds. Furthermore, as the
responsibility is not completely theirs, these governments have weak
incentives to gather relevant information to take adequate decisions.
For this system to work it is necessary to have a clear assignrnent
of responsibilities, with local public services provided exclusively by
local governrnents (i.e., those that the theoretical framework assigned
only to states and municipaljtjes). The FG has to concentrate on the
other functions, without interfering in municipal and state responsi
bilities. It should persist (and even increase its participation) in the
distribution function. However, it should restrict itselfto progressive
taxation and fund transfers that allow ah regions to provide the
adequate amount of services with national characteristics, leaving
expenditure decisions to the states and allowing thern to take respon
sibility for these decisions.
The transfers involved in the Ramo 33, estabhished for the first
time in the 1998 federal budget, are a start in this direction. There are
five funds to finance education, health, local infrastructure, for states
and municipalities, security and other local issues, and for debt
problems. There is a definition ofthe responsibiljties of each govern
ment. 24 The transfers ofRamo 33 are predictable, as there is a calendar
ofthepayments to eachgovernment. 25 The use ofconditional transfers
for education and health fits perfectly within this article: both are
national services that are better provided at the local level. A debt




problem for local governments, in the context of the banking crisis
Mexico is facing at the moment, is a national problem. Conditional
transfers for local infrastructure are more problematic when they are
aimed at local services, however several federations, such as the US,
or the European Community use them to promote specific develop
ment objectives. The main problem with theRamo 33 transfers is that
there is not a public formula for dividing them among localities.
This allows for discretion in their assignment. It is important to solve
this problem before recommending the extension of this mechanism
to other functions. In any case, it is too early to judge the success of
this procedure.
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